

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 ROME 03707 01 OF 02 052122Z

67

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-11 ACDA-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04

H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02

SS-15 USIA-06 /075 W

----- 019325

P R 051750Z MAR 76

FM AMEMBASSY ROME

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6197

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

USMISSION GENEVA

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMCONSUL MUNICH

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ROME 3707

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, IT, UR

SUBJECT: BERLINGUER'S SPEECH TO THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS-  
SOME OBSERVATIONS

1. SUMMARY. WE TAKE EXCEPTION WITH THOSE WHO ARGUE THAT ITALIAN  
COMMUNIST PARTY (PCI) SECRETARY GENERAL ENRICO BERLINGUER'S SPEECH  
AT THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS REPRESENTED A NEW DEPARTURE AND WAS  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ROME 03707 01 OF 02 052122Z

DESIGNED TO SERVE AS A DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE FROM

MOSCOW. THE PRINCIPLE POINTS MADE BY BERLINGUER HAVE LONG BEEN FAMILIAR

TO ITALIAN AUDIENCES, AND IT WAS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT THEY USED A ROSTRUM IN MOSCOW TO ENUNCIATE THEM. IN DESCENDING ORDER OF PRIORITY BERLINGUER WAS ADDRESSING THREE AUDIENCES, THE ITALIAN POPULATION, WESTERN OBSERVERS AND POLITICANS, AND FINALLY THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY AND ITS CAMP FOLLOWERS. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHAT HE SAID SHOULD BE MEASURED IN TERMS OF THE FOLLOWING FACTORS: THE SUDDEN GROWTH IN PCI VOTING STRENGTH IN ITALY, THE EVOLUTION OF A SO-CALLED EUROCOMMUNISM, AND THE SUDDEN DISCOVERY WITHIN WESTERN CIRCLES OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY. THE SPEECH OBVIOUSLY PROVIDED BERLINGUER WITH A DOMESTIC POLITICAL BOOST AND INTERNATIONAL EXPOSURE. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD NOT APPEAR THAT IT REPRESENTED AN INITIATIVE WHICH WOULD DEEPEN ANY EXISTING DIVERGENCY BETWEEN THE PCI AND THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY (CPSU).  
END SUMMARY.

2. THE DECISION. EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO US INDICATES THAT THE DECISION ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE PCI DELEGATION TO THE CPSU CONGRESS WAS A DIFFICULT ONE FOR THE PARTY'S LEADERSHIP. OBVIOUSLY THE CRUX OF THE MATTER WAS WHETHER PARTY SECRETARY GENERAL BERLINGUER WOULD LEAD THE DELEGATION OR WOULD CEDE THIS TASK TO A SUBORDINATE. IT CAN BE GENERALLY ASSUMED THAT THE FACTORS WEIGHING MOST HEAVILY ON THE DECISION WERE THOSE CONCERNED WITH HAVING THE MOST POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE PARTY'S POLITICAL OFFENSIVE WITHIN ITALY. CLEARLY, THE EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT OF FRENCH PARTY SECRETARY MARCHAIS, FOLLOWED BY THAT OF SPANISH COMMUNIST LEADER CARRILLO, TO PASS UP ATTENDANCE AT THE CONGRESS COMPLICATED THE PCI DECISION MAKING PROCESS SINCE NON-ATTENDANCE OR ATTENDANCE BECAME TO SOME EXTENT IN THE PUBLIC EYE A MEASURE OF A PARTY'S APPROVAL OF SOVIET POLICY AND PRACTICE.

3. THE SPEECH. JUDGING FROM PRESS REACTION, BERLINGUER'S SPEECH, NEXT TO BREZHNEV'S FORMAL OPENING REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, WAS THE ONE WHICH CREATED THE MOST STIR IN THE OUTSIDE WORLD. WITH THE ADVANTAGE OF HINDSIGHT, WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS IS EXACTLY THE OBJECTIVE THAT BERLINGUER AND HIS ADVISORS HAD IN MIND WHEN THE FINAL DECISION TO GO TO MOSCOW WAS MADE. THE OCCASION  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ROME 03707 01 OF 02 052122Z

OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY SIMPLY OFFERED TO BERLINGUER A HIGH VISIBILITY PLATFORM FROM WHICH TO SPEAK TO A VARIETY OF AUDIENCES, THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH WAS THE ITALIAN POPULATION. AT THE SAME TIME HE WAS ADDRESSING HIMSELF TO WESTERN POLITICIANS AND POLITICAL OBSERVERS AND FINALLY TO THE SOVIET COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP AND THE ASSEMBLED CAMP FOLLOWERS.

4. THE CONTENTS. CONTRARY TO MANY OBSERVATIONS, WHAT BERLINGUER SAID WAS NOT NEW, AND IT WAS NOT EVEN THE FIRST TIME THAT HE SAID THE THINGS THAT HE DID IN MOSCOW. UNDENIABLY, THE PORTIONS OF BERLINGUER'S SPEECH ON PLURALISTIC DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL ROADS TO COMMUNISM CREATE A MEASURE OF HEARTBURN FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, SIMILAR ONES HAVE IN THE PAST AND THEY WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO IN THE FUTURE. BUT AS ALBERTO RONCHEY, ONE OF ITALY'S FOREMOST COMMENTATORS AND SPECIALISTS ON COMMUNIST AFFAIRS POINTED OUT IN CORRIERE DELLE SERA-ON MARCH3, BERLINGUER SAID THE SAME THINGS IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW IN 1969, AND TO SOME EXTENT HIS TONE WAS EVEN MORE RIGID IN VIEW OF THE RELATIVELY BRIEF INTERVENING PERIOD BETWEEN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE CONVENING OF THE CONFERENCE. FOR EXAMPLE, ON FEBRUARY 27 BERLINGUER SAID THAT IN ITALY TODAY, THE WORKING CLASS IS ABLE AND OUGHT TO ASSUME "ITS HISTORIC ROLE IN A PLURALISTIC AND DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM." IN 1961 HE SAID THAT IN THE CONDITIONS IN ITALY, THE HEGEMONY OF THE WORKING CLASS OUGHT TO BE RELAIZED "IN A PLURALISTIC AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM." SPEAKING LAST WEEK IN MOSCOW, BERLINGUER TALKED ABOUT THE NEED FOR THE "RESPECT OF THE AUTONOMY" OF EVERY PARTY. IN 1969 HE SAID THAT "OUR OBJECTIVE REQUIRES THAT WE ELABORATE OUR OWN AUTONOMOUS ROAD." THIS YEAR BERLINGUER SPOKE OF "THE RECOGNITION AND RESPECT OF THE FULL INDEPENDENCE "OF EVERY NATION AND OF EACH COMMUNIST PARTY." SEVEN YEARS AGAO HE SAID: "IT IS NECESSARY TO RECOGNIZE FULLY THE INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY PARTY."

5. ONCE BERLINGUER GOT AWAY FROM THE PROBLEM AREA OF THE AUTONOMOUS ROAD FOR INDIVIDUAL PARTIES, THERE WAS VIRTUALLY NOTHING ADDITIONAL TO WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD TAKE SERIOUS OBJECTIONS. HE LEVELED NO CRITICISM AT SOVIET INTERNAL STRUCTURES OR PRACTICES, INCLUDING VIOLATIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS WHICH

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 ROME 03707 01 OF 02 052122Z

IS AN OCCASIONAL THEME OF THE PCI WHEN UNDER ATTACK IN ITALY. ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES, HE SPECIFICALLY PRAISED THE USSR FOR PUSHING FORWARD WITH THE "PEACE PROGRAM" ADOPTED AT THE LAST PARTY CONGRESS NOTING ALSO THAT "FOR THE MAJOR PART, THE COURSE OF THINGS WAS FAVORABLE FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND FOR THE FORCES THAT OPPOSE IMPERIALISM." AND BERLINGUER GIVES SOVIET TENACITY CREDIT FOR BRINGING ABOUT THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY. FINALLY, THERE IS NOT ONE WORD ABOUT INCREASING GROWTH OF SOVIET POWER AND THEIR UTILIZATION OF IT TO PURSUE FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN DIVERSE AREAS OF THE WORLD.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 ROME 03707 02 OF 02 052235Z

67

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-11 ACDA-05 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04

H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02

SS-15 USIA-06 /075 W

----- 020736

P R 051750Z MAR 76

FM AMEMBASSY ROME

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6198

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

USMISSION GENEVA

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMCONSUL MUNICH

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ROME 3707

BY THE REACTION AT HOME AND ABROAD. IT IS NOT SURPRISING  
THAT THE BERLINGUER SPEECH TO THE CONGRESS RECEIVED PROMINENT  
ATTENTION BOTH IN ITALY AND ABROAD. IN A GATHERING OF THIS  
NATURE WHICH IS LONG ON RHETORIC AND SHORT ON HARD MATERIAL  
FOR THE MEDIA, ANYTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY IS BOUND TO  
RECEIVE ATTENTION AND REPORTAGE. WITHOUT DOUBT THE PCI  
FACTORED THIS INTO ITS DECISION TO HAVE BERLINGUER TO TO  
MOSCOW. ATTENTION TO BERLINGUER HIMSELF AND TO HIS SPEECH  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ROME 03707 02 OF 02 052235Z

OBTAINING WAS HEIGHTENED BY HIS PARTY'S IMPRESSIVE GAINS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE ELECTIONS LAST JUNE. ADDITIONALLY, THE EMERGENCE OF A SO-CALLED EUROCOMMUNIST MOVEMENT HAS, IN A RATHER DRAMATIC MANNER, ONCE AGAIN FOCUSED ATTENTION ON DIVERGENCIES WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT AND ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS DEVELOPMENT FOR THE SOVIET EFFORT TO CONSOLIDATE ITS HEGEMONY OVER THIS MOVEMENT. AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LARGEST WESTERN COMMUNIST PARTY TO WHOM SOME OF THE OTHER EUROPEAN PARTIES APPEAR TO BE TURNING FOR AT LEAST SOME OF THEIR INSPIRATION, BERLINGUER SERVED TO SYMBOLIZE MOST FORCEFULLY THIS EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT WHEN HE STOOD BEFORE THE ASSEMBLED AT THE PALACE OF CONGRESSES IN MOSCOW. FINALLY, THE "DISCOVERY" OF THE PCI WITHIN WESTERN CIRCLES CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE EXTENSIVE PRESS COVERAGE THE BERLINGUER SPEECH RECEIVED.

7. WITHIN ITALY, ASSESSMENTS OF THE SPEECH RANGED FROM DESCRIBING IT AS REPRESENTING A TOTAL BREAK WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO DEEP CYNICISM. PREDICTABLY, THE LEFT REACTED POSITIVELY TO THE SPEECH WITH A SOCIALIST ORIENTED NEWSPAPER SUCH AS LA REPUBBLICA WRITING THAT "WITHOUT DRAMA, THE PCI CARRIED OUT...IN MOSCOW ITS FINAL SEPARATION FROM SOVIET LEADERSHIP. IT HAS BEEN A LONG OPERATION; NOW IT IS OVER." SOCIALIST (PSI) LEADERS HAVE ALSO REACTED FAVORABLY WITH PARTY SECRETARY DE MARTINO NOTING AT THE CURRENT PSI CONGRESS THAT BERLINGUER'S MOSCOW SPEECH REPRESENTED A "HISTORIC CHOICE" FOR THE PCI WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS GENUINE AND NOT TACTICAL. MOVING TOWARDS THE CENTER AND THE RIGHT OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM ONE NOTES GREATER SKEPTICISM AND AN EMPHASIS ON DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE AREAS WHICH BERLINGUER COULD HAVE ADDRESSED AND DID NOT, I.E. THE SOVIET MODEL, TREATMENT OF DISSIDENTS, ETC.

8. FOR ITS PART, THE PCI HAS BASKED IN THE PUBLICITY IT RECEIVED, ALTHOUGH EFFORTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO DOWNPLAY THE SENSATIONAL STATEMENTS EMPHASIZING THAT THE SPEECH REPRESENTED A FINAL SPLIT WITH THE USSR. SPEAKING IN TURIN MARCH 1, PCDSEBEUPNFPNNH MEMBER GIANCARLO PAJETTA TOOK DIRECT ISSUE WITH THOSE WHO HAVE TAKEN THIS LINE. HE SAID THAT "IF THERE IS ANYTHING WHICH SHOWS MISUNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WE ARE DOING," IT WAS THIS WAY OF MISINTERPRETING THE PARTY'S POLICIES. "THE PROBLEM IS NOT TO BREAK AWAY; IT IS TO MAINTAIN AND EXTEND TIES WHICH, CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ROME 03707 02 OF 02 052235Z

HOWEVER, DO NOT HAVE A LITURGICAL SIGNIFICANCE. THE OBJECTIVE IS TO MAKE OUR LINE KNOWN." THE PARTY'S DAILY L'UNITA TOOK THE SAME LINE WHEN IT STATED THAT HEADLINES SUCH AS "BERLINGUER BREAKS" (IN LA REPUBBLICA) DO NOT CORRESPOND EITHER TO THE TONE CONSTRUCTIVE DEBATE PURSUED BY THE PCI ON THE INTERNATIONAL

LEVEL."

9. COMMENT: ON BALANCE, BOTH FROM THE STANDPOINT OF DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION, BERLINGUER'S APPEARANCE BEFORE THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS WAS A PLUS FOR THE PCI. AT THE VERY LEAST IT IS OF NOTE BECAUSE HE SAID THE THINGS HE DID IN MOSCOW. WHAT HE SAID WAS IN AND OF ITSELF NEITHER INNOVATIVE NOR ESPECIALLY PROVACATIVE, AND WE TAKE EXCEPTION WITH THOSE WHO ARGUE THAT THE SPEECH REPRESENTS A DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE FROM MOSCOW. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ITALIAN POLITICS, BERLINGUER COULD NOT HAVE SAID LESS ONCE HE HAD DECIDED TO GO TO MOSCOW AND IN THE FACE OF SOVIET CRITICISM ABOUT THE ERRING WAYS OF CERTAIN WESTERN COMMUNIST PARTIES. HOWEVER, HE PROBABLY DID LITTLE TO REDUCE THE PCI'S GREATEST DOMESTIC HANDICAP, WHICH IS POSED BY ITS IDENTIFICATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION, IN ITS STRUGGLE TO WIN THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF A GREATER PORTION OF THE ITALIAN VOTING POPULATION. THIS OBJECTIVE WOULD HAVE TAKEN SUBSTANTIALLY STRONGER LANGUAGE THAN THE PCI IS PREPARED TO USE AT A MOMENT WHEN IT IS PURSUING A POLICY OF INTERNAL AUTONOMY TOGETHER WITH FRIENDSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONALISM. FINALLY, WE SEE NOTHING IN BERLINGUER'S POSITION THAT WILL DEEPEN AT THIS MOMENT THE ALREADY EXISTING DIVERGENCIES BETWEEN THE PCI AND THE CPSU. UNDOUBTEDLY, THE PCI REPRESENTS A CERTAIN CHALLENGE TO THE SOVIET UNION, PRIMARILY IN THE CPSU'S EFFORT TO ESTABLISH ITS HEGEMONY OVER THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. BUT THE CPSU ALSO HAS A CERTAIN NEED FOR THE PCI AND THE TASK TO THE BREZHNEV LEADERSHIP AT THIS JUNCTURE IS HOW TO RECONCILE THE ITALIAN CHALLENGE WITH ITS OWN PERCEIVED NEEDS. VOLPE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** PARTY LEADERS, SPEECHES, PARTY MEETINGS, PARTY ORGANIZATION, REORGANIZATIONS, PARTY FACTIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 05 MAR 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** ullricre  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976ROME03707  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D760085-0299  
**From:** ROME  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1976/newtext/t19760390/aaaadbq.tel  
**Line Count:** 307  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 6  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** ullricre  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 25 MAR 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <25 MAR 2004 by CunninFX>; APPROVED <30 JUL 2004 by ullricre>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** BERLINGUER'S SPEECH TO THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS- SOME OBSERVATIONS  
**TAGS:** PFOR, PINT, IT, UR, PCI, CPSU, (BERLINGUER, ENRICO)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006